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the Judicial Code; excerpts from committee reports concerning
these statutes; and forms of Bureau letters and forms for use
in the Board of Tax Appeals and in the courts, the latter includink both official forms and forms of pleading from precedents.
The appendix thus includes, in form available for ready reference, the official rules, statutory and otherwise, for carrying on
tax appeals and a fairly complete set of forms for the same
purpose.
The book is well indexed and there are tables of cases with
decisions of the Board and of the courts listed separately. At
the beginning a rather full analysis of the contents of the chapters is given, so that no difficulty should be experienced in locating the references to any particular subject-matter in the book.
The book is not only the leader, but is almost alone in its
particular field. Furthermore, it is a thoroughly good piece
of work and should be extremely useful to all practitioners working in Federal tax matters.
ROBERT C. BROWN.

Indiana University School of Law.
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE*
At risk of being charged with superficiality by Mr. Dickinson,
one might say that this study is concerned with four problems:
the nature of the concept of supremacy of the law; the relation,
in theory, of administrative adjudications to the idea of the
supremacy of the law; the practice of American state and federal
courts in determining under what circumstances and to what
extent administrative findings shall be subject to review by the
courts; and the relation of legal education to the problem of
reconciling the goal of supremacy of the law with the political
necessity of administrative adjudications. In each of these departments the author demonstrates an excellent preparation for
his task, the net result of his labors being an admirably balanced
and lucid introduction to a subject of most timely interest to
those who are at all concerned with the problem of administrative law in the United States.
In his discussion of the concept of "supremacy of the law",
the author explains his understanding of the meaning of the
term and traces the history of the doctrine that public officials
should act within limits placed by the law. While the efforts
of the author are directly aimed at tracing the doctrine in British and American history, he goes aside to show that the doctrine
was and is not peculiar to Anglo-American people but was lightly
indulged in in ancient Rome (Seneca and Tacitus cited to prove
this), and that it served as a degree of comfort fo the church
fathers. In his elucidation of this topic the author cites and
quotes from ancient, medieval and modern theorists, writers on
* Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United
States. By John Dickinson. Volume II of Harvard Studies in Administrative Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1927. Pages
xiii, 403. Price $5.00.
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political theory, historians, books on jurisprudence, judicial decisions, and the law review articles.
Mr. Dickinson asserts (p. 35) that adjudication by administrative tribunals differs from adjudication by the common law
courts "in precisely the particulars which furnish the reasons
for the law's insistence that every individual shall be entitled to
have his rights tried in a law court". He sees the difference to
be "at least three" in number: (1) administrative tribunals
are not bound by the common law rules of evidence; (2) parties
before the administrative tribunal do not enjoy trial by jury;
and (3) "administrative tribunals decide controversies coming
before them, not by fixed rules of law, but by the application
of governmental discretion or policy". This latter quality, the
author explains, arises largely from the fact that administrative
bodies do not possess the independence accorded the courts but
are part and parcel of the political branches of the government.
The problem of preserving the supremacy of the law while permitting the very real advantages of administrative determinations is to be solved by allowing the regular courts a proper
jurisdiction to review the findings of the administrative body;
just what is a "proper" power of review being the essential
question which occasioned the writing of this book.
One-half of the work is devoted to a study of the extent to
whicl the United States courts will review the findings of administrative tribunals, the study being divided so as to allow separate consideration of the practice of the courts according to the
field of administration involved. The author reveals that there
is sufficient diversity in the practice of the courts according to
the field of administration involved to justify his classification.
In the limited space which is devoted to the examination of cases
on review of administrative findings (some 800 cases are listed
in the table at the end of the book) .one can hardly expect to find
a complete treatment of the subject. Of this the author is fully
aware, as he reveals in his preface; indeed, he declares that
his modest hope is little more than to emphasize the need of a
treatise on the subject. Mr. Dickinson is most satisfactory in
his discussion of the cases involving review of the findings of
iublic utilities commissions, particularly the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the findings of the Federal Trade Commission. Especial attention is given to the case of Ohio Valley
Witer Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1919), 253 U. S. 287, which
the author views as a kind of ancient mariner holding up the
orderly procession of the precedents tending to establish that
the administrative body is final authority in the determination
of facts. The sketchy handling of the cases reviewing the findings of administrative tribunals in the general field of police
regulation, e. g., boards of health, workmens' compensation
boards, etc., demonstrates the crying need of more extensive
study of that type of cases.
The author's discoveries as to the extent to which the courts
will go in reviewing questions of law and questions of fact are
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not to be recapitulated in the compass of a short review. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that he finds the extent of review
differing according to the field of administration involved and
according to the form of proceeding in which review is sought.
It should be further noted that the author makes incisive and
illuminating inquiry into the problem of what Constitutes a question of law and what constitutes a question of fact.
The final chapter of the book, entitled "The Supremacy of
the Law and the Problem of Legal Education", is a good handling of the familiar plea for broader social and economic training of embryo lawyers. The author goes to the point of outlining a proposed course of study for pre-law students, even
suggesting texts, the reason back of this attention to details
being, apparently, a conviction that pre-law students should be
instructed in groups reserved to themselves. It is submitted
by the reviewer that this would be but a makeshift reform; the
failure in instruction in the social sciences is due to the fact
that college instructors as a class have shown no intelligent comprehension of the task involved in the teaching profession.
When the college instructor has applied himself so intelligently
and so religiously to his task as to ascertain the processes,
specific responses if one prefers that phrase, which occur in the
act of learning, he will then be in a position to train the student
in a technique of analyzing and weighing material and social
phenomena, which, it is submitted, is the ultimate aim of education, whether of the pre-law student or the pre-theological student. This, of course, evades the question of casting aside class
instruction in favor of individual tutoring, a step which college
administrators and givers of endowments seem not to be considering in the United States today.
Mention must be made of numerous special notes which are
attached here and there to the text. These are matters which
might, with further work, have been turned into articles or
comments for law reviews. Some of these, e. g., one at p. 106 if.,
entitled "Notice and Hearing", and one at p. 115 if., entitled
"Mathematical Theory of Law", run up to about 1,500 words in
length. One might contend that the author has forced a place
for these in the text, and so he seems to have feared; however,
the symmetry of the work is not destroyed, if it is impaired.
It seems to the reviewer that in this book Mr. Dickinson has
broken some fertile ground in a very competent manner. The
study presents the magnitude, the form, and something of the
detail of the problem attacked, and this is done with an array
of authorities and a clarity and coherence of style not often
achieved in the same work Mr. Dickinson may expect to receive
in the future a ready ear from those who have read this book.
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN.
University of Illinois.

